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British and Somali Views of Muhammad 
Abdullah Hassan’s Jihad, 1899–1920
John P. Slight
An arid desert country…home of a ‘Mad Mullah,’ cause of 
one of the most prolonged and least successful of our ‘little 
wars.’1
I. Overview
Since the start of Hassan’s jihad against unbelievers and insufficiently 
pious Muslims in 1899, the “Cinderella of the Empire” had suffered 
terribly.2 Hassan’s jihad caused “universal perdition,” with an esti-
mated 200,000 deaths over twenty years in a territory of three million 
people.3 An estimated 30,000 alone died in three years as the result of 
internecine warfare after the British decided the cost of keeping the 
“Mad Mullah” in check was too burdensome and withdrew to the 
coast in 1909. The withdrawal led Hassan to resume raiding Somali 
tribes in the protectorate. This, coupled with the British policy of arm-
ing these tribes to fend for themselves, contributed to the death toll.4 
Hassan was condemned by the British, but a few of the same observers 
also grudgingly admired his determination and sustained resistance to 
imperial power.
This essay shows how the varied British interpretations of Hassan 
served to reduce his movement to a one-dimensional character. It also 
illustrates how Hassan, like other contemporary Muslim leaders in 
Northeast Africa, was believed to be part of a “Turco-German” plot 
against the British during the First World War. The article utilizes a rich 
existing corpus of source material to analyze Hassan’s views regarding 
jihad and his motivation for beginning and continuing this struggle. It 
also demonstrates how some Somalis viewed his jihad. These Muslim 
views show how British perceptions of Hassan failed to discern the 
profound and complex religious factors that motivated his movement.
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Somaliland, “a veritable furnace for eight or nine months” of the 
year, became a British protectorate in 1885.5 British motives for expan-
sion were to obtain provisions for the nearby Aden garrison and to 
forestall further expansion by rival European powers on the Somali 
coast. The protectorate was seen as an insignificant corner of the 
Empire until the rise of Hassan. Born in 1856, Hassan studied under 
local religious scholars and then traveled for rihlah (travels in search 
of religious knowledge). He undertook the hajj and studied under 
Mohammed Salih in Mecca in the 1890s.6 He returned to Somaliland in 
1895 as the local head of Salih’s own Sufi order, and preached unsuc-
cessfully at Berbera, constrained by disputes with other orders. Has-
san found more success when he traveled to the Somali hinterland. 
His jihad began in 1899 with a raid on a Qadiriyyeh Sufi zawiya at 
Sheikh. After that he made clear his hostility to Somaliland’s British 
and Ethiopian rulers, as well as all Somalis who were not sufficiently 
pious in his eyes. Britain’s four military expeditions against Hassan 
in 1901–1904 ended in failure due to his guerrilla warfare tactics. The 
Ilig Treaty of 1905 led Hassan to migrate to Italian Somaliland. A quiet 
period followed, but the British withdrawal to the Somali coast in 
1909 caused widespread anarchy in the interior, and Hassan returned 
to continue his jihad. The establishment of the Somali Coastal Con-
stabulary, which became the Camel Corps, harried Hassan from 1912 
onward and engaged in “desultory fighting” throughout the First 
World War.7 Hassan’s switch from mobility to fixed defensive fortress 
positions gave the Camel Corps greater military success against him. 
In 1920, the Colonial and War Offices sanctioned a campaign using 
the RAF and the Camel Corps, which resulted in the destruction of his 
forts, the deaths of many followers, and his flight to Ethiopia. Before 
Hassan could regroup, he died from influenza in December 1920 and 
the remnants of his movement returned to their tribes.
Works dealing with Hassan fall into three categories: (1) those writ-
ten when he was active or recently dead,8 (2) the 1960s and 1970s, after 
Somali independence,9 and (3) studies published since the 1970s.10 The 
roots of the historiography about Hassan lie in contemporaneous Brit-
ish insights in works that form a rich seam of enquiry into their inter-
pretations of the man and his movement. Works written after Somali 
independence are coloured by nationalist feeling and are largely pan-
egyrics to Hassan. He was seen as the Father of Somali Independence. 
These analyses provide little examination of his Islamic motivations. 
The last category of works strikes a more balanced tone. They view 
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Hassan’s movement as informed by his Islamic beliefs,11 or as moti-
vated initially by religion, but they also stress his preoccupation with 
politics, the organization of his movement, and military measures.12 
These recent works are more nuanced than the contemporaneous Brit-
ish interpretations of Hassan outlined below.
*****
Hassan was the most implacable Muslim enemy of the British dur-
ing this period. While his movement was small in scale compared to 
other resistance movements in the Empire, such as the Boers, Hassan’s 
successful military leadership and organization confounded British 
attempts to destroy his movement until his switch to fixed fortress 
positions rendered him more vulnerable to attack. The resilience of 
Hassan’s movement led to several British responses. Whilst many Brit-
ish observers acknowledged the religious motivations for Hassan’s 
jihad, most belittled the man. First was the interpretation that Hassan 
was a religious fanatic, who caused misery to the Somali population 
and set back the British “civilising mission” in Somaliland. This inter-
pretation reduced the man to the stereotype of a fanatical Muslim 
rebel, a “Mad Mullah.”
A second interpretation sought to strip away his Islamic motivation 
and contended that Hassan was using the religion to mask a cattle-
thieving operation. This view stemmed from the desire of officials to 
downplay the continued effectiveness of his movement.
During the First World War, a third interpretation emerged: that 
Hassan was influenced by enemy propaganda. Either through unwill-
ingness or inability, most British missed other factors that drove Has-
san, such as his Sufi influences and profoundly religious motivation, 
anchored in a reformist and revivalist context. However, some observ-
ers picked up on this and so not all British analyses of Hassan viewed 
him through such simplistic negative tropes. The British were aware 
that he was not only opposed to them because Somalis bore the brunt 
of his violence. This rebounded on Hassan, with segments of Somali 
society opposed to him, such as religious leaders and certain tribal 
chiefs, and led to a lack of support for his jihad.
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II. Hassan as a “Fanatical” Muslim Rebel
Much of the published British literature on Hassan repeats the works 
of others and reinforces several perceptions of him, the key one being 
that he was a fanatical rebel. These writers were mainly officials and 
soldiers who had served in Somaliland. While none had met Has-
san, they either saw the effects of his jihad on the Somali population 
or encountered his followers in skirmishes. Their published accounts 
tally with the few official British papers related to the movement that 
remain in colonial archives.13 Contemporaneous accounts view Has-
san’s movement in a variety of ways, yet all portray him as a militant 
tyrant.
British officials and commentators, however removed or close to 
Hassan’s movement, could not fail to be aware of the religious charac-
ter of his struggle. Captain Summers, who served in Somaliland, said 
Hassan “established a great reputation as a religious leader,” which 
helped him gather a following from tribes in the Ogaden under Ethio-
pian rule and in British Somaliland.14 Angus Hamilton’s account added 
a further layer of British understanding. He emphasized the effect of 
the hajj on Hassan, who returned from Mecca “with the intention of 
reviving the religious spirit of his people” through his jihadist move-
ment.15 This places Hassan in the conceptual framework of a “returning 
hajji” whose spiritual and intellectual experiences inspired his motiva-
tion for beginning a militant Islamic movement against the rule of non-
believers over Muslims. This appreciation of the revivalist element 
of Hassan’s movement is corroborated by Henry F. Prevost-Battersby, 
who stated that Hassan “seemed inspired by a genuine passion for the 
faith,” which led him to “rebuke the easy going Islamism” of Somalis. 
While this was seen as a primary motivation for Hassan’s jihad, it was 
apparently inevitable that this preaching would clash with the British, 
because it was “difficult to preach the pure faith of the Prophet to a 
people under foreign rule without saying something detrimental to the 
foreigner.”16 But these interpretations of the religious character of his 
movement were overlaid with representations that reduced Hassan to 
a crude Muslim tyrant.
British representations of Hassan as a fanatic are most clearly seen in 
the epithet they gave him, “The Mad Mullah,” a title routinely used in 
literature and official correspondence.17 The first mention of this moni-
ker was in an official report in 1899, in which Somaliland Consul-Gen-
eral J. Hayes-Sadler wrote, “the Mullah has gone religious mad.”18 This 
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characterization was frequently used by subsequent authors as it cre-
ated a colourful picture of a stereotypical Muslim fanatic that the Brit-
ish public were familiar with from the days of the Mahdi. For example, 
an article in the United Empire journal said, “Religious fanatics, espe-
cially in the East, are frequently dubbed mad,” Hassan’s insanity being 
an “obsession that he was the only true follower of Mohammed, and 
that everyone else was an infidel.”19 The British saw this resistance as 
irrational, a result of madness brought on by religious fanaticism and 
brain damage,20 as opposed to what was closer to the truth, which was 
Hassan’s deeply felt grievances at the state of Islam in his homeland 
and the fact that Somalis were ruled by non-Muslims. Observers such 
as Major H. G. C. Swayne, a soldier who served in Somaliland, had a 
more nuanced view of this “madness,” contending that Hassan was 
part of “propaganda in which Sufi and other mullahs like him were 
engaged.”21 Hassan’s Sufism will be discussed below, but first it is nec-
essary to examine some of the more lurid imagery of Hassan that the 
British seemed to revel in describing.
Added to Hassan’s “religious madness” are British portrayals of him 
as a cruel despot who engaged in torture, mutilation, and widespread 
atrocities that destroyed the lives of ordinary Somalis and his followers 
alike. For example, Major H. A. Rayne, in his judicial capacity as Dis-
trict Commissioner at Zeila, encountered “wrecks of women and chil-
dren,” who asked for relief. Apparently their plight was due to Hassan: 
“their villages had been destroyed, their property looted, their men-
folk killed, by the murdering gang of thieves who carried out inces-
santly the merciless policy of this awful man.”22 Swayne described the 
“gruesome sight” at Medishe fort after the British captured it, “typical 
of the methods of the Mad Mullah.” There, a solider saw the remains 
of one of Hassan’s followers, “at the end of a rope, suspended from 
the roof over a slow fire, hung by the waist” as punishment for some 
transgression.23 Hamilton wrote that as a result of setbacks against the 
British in 1903, some Somalis attempted to desert. Consequently, “It 
was ‘heads off’ just then in the camp of the Mullah upon the smallest 
pretext, for the Holy Man had recourse to the sternest measures to 
enforce obedience.” This apparently caused “dissensions in his coun-
cil” and “little cohesion among his followers.”24 This points to a fur-
ther complexity of Hassan’s movement. It was not a monolithic entity 
united against the British.
These sensationalist tales were not only confined to writers appeal-
ing to the British market. They were reflected in official British intel-
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ligence reports. One stated that, “atrocities…have recently been 
practised by the Mullah to an unprecedented extent. Wholesale execu-
tions are carried out on the slightest pretexts, and men, women and 
children go in fear of their lives.” The report appears to be an attempt 
to show that Hassan relied upon tyranny and misinformation in order 
to keep his followers, who otherwise would “surely” desert but for 
“the belief that we torture and kill captives…fostered by the Mullah.”25 
These accounts implied that the results of Hassan’s jihad fell most heav-
ily on Somalis as opposed to the British.
Douglas Jardine, another Somaliland official who wrote a book on 
Hassan, summed up these negative views of him but stressed he knew 
no other way of acting. Jardine described Hassan as: “Tyrant and cut-
throat, slayer of innocent women and children, cattle-thief, profligate, 
and libertine.” These “opprobrious epithets” show how British observ-
ers interpreted Hassan in caricatured terms.26
This superficiality extended to Hassan being compared to that other 
Muslim “fanatic,” the Mahdi, an easy analogy for the British to make. 
To observers such as Ismay, an intelligence officer in Somaliland, the 
connection was direct. The Mahdi’s successes made such an impres-
sion that Hassan “tried a similar organization.”27 Ralph Drake-Brock-
man says that tales of the Mahdi, apparently heard by Hassan in Cairo 
and Alexandria,28 “held him spellbound.”29 The Mahdi was portrayed 
as a freedom fighter, who “raised the flag of revolt against a people 
suffering from poverty and oppression,” whereas Hassan was an evil 
figure who “brought destitution and even anarchy.”30 These interpreta-
tions show the inability of the British to view Hassan on his own terms, 
a man engaged in a jihad to make Somalis follow a purer form of Islam 
as well as overthrow their non-Muslim rulers.
Richard Corfield of the Somali Camel Constabulary believed Has-
san was a mere cattle thief. Corfield wrote in letters written in June 
and July 1910 that after the Governor-General of Sudan, Sir Reginald 
Wingate, left Somaliland after his consultative trip to find a solution 
to the issue of Hassan, his “illusions” about Hassan were “completely 
broken.” These illusions were that “he was a great religious fanatic, 
like the Mahdi, with the possibility of wielding enormous power in the 
Muhammedan world.” Corfield thought that Wingate now realized 
that Hassan was “little better than a raiding cattle thief.”31 Corfield 
hoped to present Hassan in a more prosaic light to his family in Eng-
land. This irritation with what Corfield saw as the elevation of Hassan 
into a religious leader was reinforced in a later letter. He wrote, “it is 
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not a religious question in Somaliland now, but merely the suppres-
sion of a very troublesome border raider…who is a cattle thief first, 
a Somali second, and thirdly, and a long way last, a very indifferent 
Mohammedan.”32
However, despite the belief that Hassan was only a criminal, Cor-
field conceded that his movement had a religious origin. This interpre-
tation is corroborated by Douglas Jardine, but his account of Hassan is 
contradictory in many places, which points to the complexity of Has-
san’s motives. Jardine claimed that any “religious or patriotic impulse 
that originally inspired the Mullah’s movement was strangled…by the 
passion for power and the plunder which rewarded victory,” and that 
most of Hassan’s followers fought “solely for loot.”33 He sought to 
remove any Islamic motivations from Hassan, as well as other Muslim 
resisters to Christian rulers, and wrote that risings “attributed to a 
wave of fanaticism can generally be traced back to an unsatisfied thirst 
for power,” and that the Muslim rebel “knows that he must disguise 
the fact that his ends are purely mundane and selfish; and he, there-
fore, proclaims to his friends and foes that he fights for the glory of 
God.”34
Historians such as B. G. Martin, S. S. Samatar, and Abdi Sheikh Abdi 
have argued that these interpretations are shallow and show a failure 
to discern the multifaceted factors behind Hassan’s movement. But 
from Jardine’s perspective, as an official who had worked in Somalil-
and for many years, this was a comforting line to take, without having 
to attempt to understand the complex nature of Hassan and the move-
ment that the British failed to overcome for more than twenty years.
Before looking at Hassan’s jihad as inspired by a religious desire to 
revive Islam in Somalia, and in the context of the wider reforming and 
revivalist elements that affected Islam in this period that the British did 
not recognize, it is first necessary to highlight a final strand of colonial 
interpretation. This view arose in the context of the First World War. 
It involved the belief that Hassan, like the Sanussiyya Sufi order and 
Sultan Ali Dinar of Darfur, had connections to the Central Powers of 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire.
III. “Turco-German” Influence during the First World War
British Somaliland was relatively unaffected by the First World War. 
However, the prioritization of troops for the Western Front meant that 
there was no opportunity for a large-scale expedition against Hassan, 
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although the historian of the Camel Corps stated, “the Dervishes had 
become extremely truculent” by 1914. This was attributed to encour-
agement from “Turkish and German propaganda.”35 This response 
showed a willingness by the British to deny agency to local leaders 
of the Islamic resistance, as illustrated in studies of the Sanussiyya 
Sufi order and the Sultan of Darfur, Ali Dinar.36 The British instead 
attributed these struggles to a wider conspiracy by Britain’s wartime 
enemies. The debatable presence of enemy propaganda was irrelevant 
to those who wrote after the War and Hassan’s demise. Apparently, 
despite “much propaganda emanating from German and Turkish 
sources in Abyssinia,” Somalis in the protectorate remained loyal to 
Britain throughout the war.37 But the British emphasis on Ottoman and 
German influence over Hassan was far less than in the examples of 
the Sanussiyya and Ali Dinar. Because Hassan’s movement had been 
active long before the War, officials could not manipulate the idea of 
Ottoman and German involvement with Hassan as much as they did 
with his co-religionists in Libya and Darfur.
Nevertheless, British intelligence in Sudan reported that the “Mul-
lah is being incited to action by Turkish emissaries from Abyssinia.” 
The report said there was a Turkish emissary in Hassan’s retinue and 
“that a Turkish flag had been presented to the Mullah who is stated to 
have said he would fly it over the fort at Hais as soon as Turkish troops 
arrived and the march on Berbera began.” This was wishful think-
ing, both on Hassan’s part and for colonial intelligence in Sudan, who 
connected every Islamic enemy in the Empire in this period to their 
wartime enemies. The report also mentioned Lij Yasu, the new Ethio-
pian emperor, who the British thought had converted to Islam and 
was “openly assisting the Mullah with ammunition.” Despite these 
“Islamic efforts” noted by the British, “friendly Somalis have proved 
loyal.”38 This Islamic influence from Ethiopia was dismissed by Brit-
ish intelligence, which thought Somalis regarded Lij Yasu as a “giant 
impostor.”39
According to Somali historian Aw Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Hassan 
appealed to the Ottoman commander at Lehaj in Yemen for help, and 
an agreement signed by Hassan’s envoy put his followers under Otto-
man protection.40 A document in the Colonial Office archives, appar-
ently circulated in the Somali hinterland, supported the British view 
that Hassan was involved with the Ottomans. It summarized the 1914 
Ottoman jihad proclamation and exhorted Somalis to join Hassan.41 
However, the document’s authenticity is unclear, and it is unknown 
Bildhaan  Vol. 10
24
whether it was circulated with Hassan’s permission or if it garnered 
any response from Somali tribesmen. Hassan did entertain a certain 
veneration for the Ottoman Sultan, as seen in his panegyric poem:
And he [Hassan] turns to his dear friend
Taking refuge with that pillar of religion
Sultan of every victory
Who lashes unbelievers
Breaks their power.42
This evidence suggests that while Hassan had some contact with the 
Ottomans and regarded their Sultan as a religious figurehead, this had 
little impact on his movement, compared to other Islamic resistance 
leaders in this period such as Ahmed al-Senussi of the Sanussiyya.
Hassan did have some dealings with Germany in this period, but in 
such an insignificant way that British officials realized it was inconse-
quential. At the end of 1916, a German armourer was sent to Hassan by 
Lij Yasu and the German Consul in Ethiopia to manufacture ammuni-
tion and repair rifles, but “received such abominable treatment that he 
escaped in June 1917, only to perish on the road.”43 This was nowhere 
near the scale of the British conviction that the Sanussiyya and Ali 
Dinar were enmeshed in Ottoman and German intrigue to challenge 
British rule. There were no British officials in Somaliland who thought 
Hassan was connected to Istanbul or Berlin in the same manner as 
those in Sudan who, in sharp contrast, produced reams of official cor-
respondence that detailed how Ali Dinar was in league with Britain’s 
wartime enemies.
Hassan had a slightly different interpretation of his relationship 
with the Ottomans, Germans, and Lij Yasu. In a letter to the British that 
responded to their accusations of his connections to all three, he wrote, 
“The suggestion is that I was weak and had to look outside for friends; 
and if, indeed, this were true and I had to look for assistance, it is only 
because of the British, and the trouble you have given me.”44 This 
appeared a half-denial. Hassan wanted to assert that he was a power 
in his own right. The British failed to discern the intricacies of Hassan’s 
movement.
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IV. Hassan’s Islamic Beliefs and Somali Responses to his Jihad
Hassan carried out his jihad under the aegis of the Salihiyya order, 
founded by Muhammad Saleh in Mecca in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. This was part of a cluster of “neo-Sufi” orders, influenced by the 
Islamic revival and reform movement, which preached a return to a 
purer form of the faith. Abdi summarizes the aims of Hassan’s mis-
sion as a struggle against the lax religious practices of Somalis and to 
revive their Islamic spirit.45 It is in this context that his jihad must be 
seen. Hassan believed that part of this agenda necessitated the tradi-
tional religious strategy of the Lesser Jihad to respond to the iniquity of 
Christian rule over Muslims. This was a facet of Hassan that the British 
failed to appreciate. However, there were some British observers who 
noted the nature and impact of Sufism on Somali society. For example, 
Frances Swayne, a rare tourist to the protectorate, wrote that Somali 
Islam was a “very strict sect…Christians would do well…to take exam-
ple by them in religious observances.”46 Another writer viewed the 
Salihiyya as “very fanatical…their extremely uncompromising reli-
gious views…resemble the austere Wahabbis.”47 Sir Geoffrey Archer, 
Governor of Somaliland, called the Salihiyya the “most fanatical” of all 
Muslims.48 British observations of Somali Sufism reflected a suspicion 
of the orders due to their supposed extremism. A “Memorandum on 
Political Affairs in Somaliland,” written after Hassan’s demise in 1925, 
showed extensive knowledge of Sufism, but with a derogatory inter-
pretation of the phenomenon. Somalis were presented as “fanatical 
and ignorant” and easily led by “Mullahs” who “infest the country.” 
The “Mullahs,” perhaps understandably after Britain’s bruising experi-
ence with Hassan, were seen as a negative force, “preaching resistance 
to Government orders” and thus a “considerable power for harm” 
against the colonial administration.49 However, like Willes-Jennings’ 
contradictory attitude,50 zawiyas were seen as harmless, which reflected 
the conflicting nature of British attitudes to Sufism.51
Hassan’s career as a jihadist leader had a profoundly religious moti-
vation but was coloured by military and political factors that arose 
from his leadership of a militant movement. Samatar and Martin 
have argued that Hassan used his leadership of the Salihiyya order in 
Somaliland to adapt the sect’s hierarchical model to create a large-scale 
organization that surmounted clan politics.52 Whilst Hassan’s move-
ment was political in nature, the religious sentiment that underpinned 
his movement is the area of focus here. Although Hassan was a reli-
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gious personality in his own right, his connection to the Salihiyya order 
was important. Jardine hinted at this when he wrote that Hassan’s fol-
lowers always went into battle “invoking the name of Mohammed 
Salih.”53 If Hassan used Islam as a front for thieving, it seems implau-
sible that his followers chanted Salih’s name before going into battle.
Another episode that shows the importance of the Salihiyya con-
nection is the denunciation of Hassan by his erstwhile mentor in 1909. 
Salih accused Hassan of “no longer minding the shar’ia law” because 
he killed and looted Somalis. Salih charged Hassan with not being a 
good Muslim and excommunicated him from the order for “not know-
ing your proper religion…Mohammedans are not those who take their 
neighbour’s blood on their hands.”54 This caused a rupture between 
Hassan’s followers but did not halt his jihad.55 The connection to the 
Salihiyya order was important, but the continuation of Hassan’s strug-
gle after the break with his mentor points out the strength of his own 
religious feelings and motivations for the struggle, consistent through-
out his career, which are examined below.
Similar to the case of Darfur’s Sultan Ali Dinar,56 there is an unusual 
amount of material on Hassan in the colonial archives. Along with 
contemporaneous British accounts and research carried out by Somali 
and other historians in the last thirty years, there are many examples of 
Hassan’s proclamations, letters, writings, and poetry.57 Analyzing these 
against the grain of their location in British sources (that used them to 
highlight Hassan’s fanaticism), it is possible to reconstruct how he saw 
his struggle as religiously motivated against British imperialism and 
insufficient piety in Somali Islam. Hassan’s proclamation before he 
began his jihad stated, “Unbelieving men of religion have assaulted 
our country from their remote homelands. They wish to corrupt our 
religion…Our aim is to cleanse the land of unbelievers.”58 This declara-
tion of struggle against the perceived oppression of Islam is supported 
by Hassan’s first letter to the British as a jihadist leader in 1899: “you 
have oppressed our ancient religion without cause…If you want war, 
we accept it.”59 Subsequent letters to the British are consistent in the 
reasons for Hassan’s jihad. One in 1903 stated his wish to “protect my 
own religion.” This letter also showed Hassan’s belief in the religious 
rightness of his cause: “We fight by God’s order…We ask for God’s 
blessing. God is with me when I write this.”60 A further letter to the 
British in 1913 humbly stated, “I am a pilgrim and a holy fighter, and 
have no wish to gain power and greatness in this world.”61 Hassan’s 
correspondence to the British had frequent references to himself as the 
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“Poor Man of God,” and repeated his mission as the defense of Islam 
against non-Muslims.62 This evidence shows Hassan as a pious Mus-
lim who saw jihad as the only way to achieve his aims of purifying the 
religion in Somaliland and eliminating non-Muslim influence.
Hassan’s motivations for the jihad are also evident in his letters and 
poems to Somali tribes. A letter to the Warsangli tribe shown to British 
officials stated that, “fighting them [the British] is the duty of every 
Muslim.” Hassan described himself as “a Dervish, hoping for God’s 
mercy and consent and forgiveness and guidance” and not as a mem-
ber of any Somali tribe. The letter highlighted his reformist and reviv-
alist leanings. Proclaiming that, “this is a time of oppression…this is a 
time in which infidels defeat Moslems,” his interpretation of the state of 
affairs in Somaliland reinforced the importance of his mission to revive 
Islam and struggle against its Christian rulers.63
Hassan’s poetry64 castigated the Somalis’ lack of Islamic fervour in 
struggling against their imperial overlords:
Somalis, rise from sleep!
Catastrophe has fallen on the land
The Unbelievers have deceived you
Since you failed to continue the jihad!65
B. G. Martin has recovered one of Hassan’s few written texts, the 
Risala, written in 1905. It answered Somali criticisms regarding his 
jihad. In the text, Hassan asserted his membership in the Salihiyya 
brotherhood. Hassan saw the jihad as an inescapable duty incumbent 
on all Muslims because “unbelievers have invaded Muslim lands.” He 
disagreed with those who argued that following Sufi rituals was suf-
ficient to fulfill the obligation for jihad. The text attacked those Soma-
lis who attributed the country’s peace and prosperity to the British 
presence. Such thinking was full of “lies and falsehood” because of 
Christianity’s “fundamental hostility to Muslims.” Justice could not 
come from Christians, only from the Qur’an. Any Somali employed by 
Christians, or who “consorted” with them, or who lived in Christian 
countries faced “contamination and degeneration.” They were “dubi-
ous Muslims” and “undesirables.” Hassan quoted the Qur’an (IV, 140): 
“if you persist in keeping company with unbelievers, you will become 
like them.” He justified attacks against his fellow Somali Muslims who 
associated with Christians because they were “unbelievers pure and 
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simple.” This rationale extended to incorrect beliefs or actions, such as 
not appearing at Friday prayers.
The issue of tawassul, intercession with God by local saints and holy 
men, occupied equal space in the text. Hassan was against this con-
cept, which explains his hostility to the Qadiriyyeh Sufi order, which 
believed it was acceptable. In expressing this opinion, Hassan appears 
to be part of the “neo-Sufi” reformation context as he reflected the 
views of al-Fasi, the intellectual ancestor of the Salihiyya order. Has-
san’s views against tawassuf revealed his sharp differences with tradi-
tional Sufism, which was pantheistic in nature.66
This text, and Hassan’s poetry, went unnoticed by the British at the 
time. Even if they were aware of these writings, it is unlikely (given 
their dismissive responses to Hassan’s letters) that their views of him 
as a fanatical Muslim rebel would have changed. Nevertheless, a selec-
tion of his poetry shows his piety and how he was driven to carry out 
the Lesser Jihad in defense of the faith. For example, one poem states:
If the blaze of the fire I kindled does not consume them
If the English dogs do not flee in headlong panic
Then, let it be said that I am not a true Muslim.67
His last poem, The Will, in 1920, is perhaps the best summary of 
Hassan’s reasons for jihad:
I, on my own volition, chose to fight the infidels
It was I who said to the filthy unbelievers—this land is not yours
It was I who sought and found the Prophet’s guidance.68
As intimated above, however, the British were not Hassan’s sole con-
cern. His jihad was as much directed against Somalis and the other 
Christian power ruling over his countrymen, Ethiopia. These two tar-
gets of his jihad are considered below.
It was Somalis, not the British, who bore the brunt of his raids and 
military actions. British sources described the fighting between Hassan 
and Somali tribes. One report mentioned Hassan being preoccupied 
with fighting the Majeerteen while he was in Italian Somaliland in 
1905–08,69 and hostility in 1913–15 between Hassan and his former ally, 
the Sultan of Las Khorai, who was motivated by the fear that his “own 
independence might be threatened.”70 The same report stated that in 
1916–17, Ali Kendid, Sultan of Obbia, also fought Hassan.71 Other pub-
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lished works also recorded Hassan’s interactions with Somali tribes. 
Capt. A. H. E. Mosse stated that in 1913, Hassan had “quarrelled, 
apparently irrevocably” with the Dolbahanta tribe.72 Hassan’s jihad 
was directed against the rival Sufi orders in the country that preached 
what he saw as an “impure” version of Islam, and against his fellow 
Somalis for being insufficiently pious Muslims who had allowed them-
selves to fall under British rule. For example, one of Hassan’s poems to 
tribes under British protection says:
Ye have mistaken the hell-ordained and Christians for the Prophet
Ye have shamelessly grovelled after the accursed
Were you noblemen (as you claim) ye would loathe the white 
infidels.73
In a similar vein is another of his poems, this time to the Isaaq tribe:
You have allowed yourselves to be led astray by the
Agents of the accursed
Had you any self respect or pride
You would not have shown such fondness
For the priests of perdition.74
Therefore, these tribes were in the firing line of Hassan’s forces, and 
most of his activities were directed against them. Fighting versus the 
British largely took the form of Hassan reacting to their unsuccessful 
expeditions and patrols sent to destroy him.
Hassan’s movement was divisive amongst Somalis. Their views of 
Hassan are largely glimpsed through British sources, and as such must 
be treated with a degree of caution because writers often sought to 
discredit the support he had from his fellow countrymen. However, 
their accounts were probably partly accurate. During the first expedi-
tions against Hassan, Captain McNeill wrote that Somalis who made 
up the bulk of his soldiers “had had all their property carried off by 
the Mullah; in some cases their wives and children had been killed 
and mutilated.”75 One Somali who fought alongside the British wrote a 
poem that included, “Allah willed me” to fight, and that he was moti-
vated by the desire “to seize Dervish camels.”76 Swayne thought that 
Somalis were “sick of the war” because regardless of which side won, 
“the tribes stand to lose heavily, from raids and the resultant loss of 
livestock.”77
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The majority of Somalis appeared to be no enthusiasts for Hassan’s 
movement because of its disastrous effects on them. However, this 
translated into apathy as opposed to ardent support for the British. 
This view is supported by a letter from the British Commissioner, who 
wrote that tribes were mostly “loyal.” The apathy was due to reliance 
on British protection. The Commissioner discounted “any disloyalty 
to us or leaning towards the Mullah, whom they have now learned 
by experience to hate and fear.”78 The Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in 1916 asserted that desertions from Hassan showed a lack of 
support for his movement.79 Some Somalis viewed Hassan as a blood-
thirsty criminal. A Berbera poet from the Isaaq clan attacked Hassan in 
this manner:
And a thousand devout worshippers he butchered as one would a 
he-goat
And caravans are given the safety of Allah
But he wantonly cuts the tendons of weary travellers and engorges 
their dates.80
This poem and others show the complexity of responses to Hassan’s 
movement.81 Somalis were far from receptive to his aims, although 
this did not translate into support for the British. Hassan’s jihad was 
directed primarily against supposedly impious Somalis, then against 
the British and Ethiopians. He encountered opposition from some 
Somali men who joined British forces after they suffered a raid by Has-
san, or those that saw him as a nuisance instead of a great Muslim and 
Somali leader. Ultimately, most Somalis appeared apathetic to his jihad. 
The majority was more concerned with surviving day-to-day life. Yet 
Hassan’s followers were firm believers in his message, and his strug-
gles against foreign rulers have had a long legacy in Somali society.
Some historians have argued that Hassan’s movement was primar-
ily caused by Ethiopian actions, and that Ethiopia was his main target 
instead of Britain.82 In fact, his jihad began in the Ogaden, which had 
suffered under Ethiopian imperialism, characterized by raids on vil-
lages and the seizure of livestock. Some British writers acknowledged 
Ethiopian imperialism as a factor that contributed to the causes of Has-
san’s jihad.83 For example, Swayne wrote that the Ethiopian occupation 
of Harar in 1899, “roused the opposition of the Ogaden,” which led to 
Hassan’s jihad against Ethiopia and Britain.84 Consequently, Britain was 
caught up in Hassan’s movement against the Ethiopians.85 An 86-year-
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old “Dervish” interviewed by S. S. Samatar in 1977 recalled Hassan’s 
first proclamation to the Somalis: “Infidel invaders have come to sur-
round us…They have come to corrupt our ancient religion…If you 
follow me, with the help of God, I will deliver you from the Amhaar 
[Ethiopians].”86 It is clear from this and British writings that Hassan 
was not only concerned with jihad against the British. His sense of 
injustice at Christian Ethiopia’s rule over Somalis motivated him to 
proclaim his jihad just as much as his experiences with British imperial-
ism.87
V. Conclusion
In the British House of Commons in February 1920, Leo Amery, Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies, aptly summarized the situation in 
Somaliland: “In the course of less than three weeks the power of the 
Dervishes in British Somaliland has been entirely destroyed.”88 During 
the war a campaign was “impracticable”89 due to military requirements 
in Europe.90 As soon as the armistice was signed in 1918, however, 
the government planned and executed a military operation that used 
the RAF to bomb Hassan’s forts, which ultimately broke his move-
ment. Hassan fled from Somaliland into Ethiopia after his defeat and 
died there from influenza in December 1920. The movement, which 
was nothing minus its extraordinary leader, swiftly disintegrated. This 
points to a lack of wider support, as no Somalis were willing to carry 
on Hassan’s struggle. It shows the divisiveness of his movement among 
Somalis who had borne the brunt of his aggression, thus limiting his 
jihad’s effectiveness. “Dervishism” became “little more than a memory, 
but for the Somali a memory of how they successfully resisted for 
more than twenty years the power of a civilised nation. Can it or will 
it resuscitate at a later date?”91 So far, it has not, although Hassan left 
a powerful legacy that transcended the narrow nature of British views 
towards his jihad.
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